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THE NEW LAW OF THRESHOLD STANDING:
THE EFFECT OF SIERRA CLUB
ON JUS TERTJI AND ON
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION
The question of standing to challenge administrative action is
a subject much confused by the use of the same word-standing-
to describe several things. In the administrative law context, stand-
ing has been used to describe problems arising from two questions:
(1) who may come into court to complain of an action of a govern-
ment agency; and (2) what arguments may he make in support of
his case.1  Partial answers to these questions come from several
sources. For example, the constitutional requirement of case or
controversy' helps answer the former question, but not the latter.
1. See text following note 65 infra.
Part of this ambiguity surrounding the word standing arises from its common
use, prior to Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), in negative contexts-a plaintiff would be said not to have
standing, see notes 10-13 infra, or an argument that he did not have standing for a
particular reason would be refuted, see notes 24-31 infra. To have standing, a plain-
tiff had to show an injury in fact to a legally protected interest. The agency ac-
tion complained of could not be committed by law to agency discretion (but no
one is legally protected from an action by law entirely discretionary). Of course,
a plaintiff who could prove that he could satisfy these requirements would have a
winning case-unless his claim was in equity, and the requirements for the ex-
ercise of equitable powers were not satisfied. Having standing, however, was not a
phrase synonymous with having a meritorious case-lack of standing was the phrase
usually used to describe situations where a failing plaintiff might have been ex-
pected to have a meritorious case if he had been actually injured, if the agency
had been given less discretion, or especially, if he had been someone else. Data
Processing, see notes 36-50 infra and accompanying text, might roughly be said to
attempt to limit the use of the word standing to cases which involved early dis-
missals in similar situations. The most difficult part of the standing problem-
whether a plaintiff has a legal interest-remains, whether or not he is put under the
head of standing. Data Processing's answer to question (1), and a generous
answer to question (2), may mean that a plaintiff no longer must possess a legal in-
terest of his own to succeed, see note 66 infra and accompanying text, but it also
seems entirely possible that the answer to question (2) will depend on factors hav-
ing to do with what legal interest the plaintiff does possess, see notes 83-92 infra
and accompanying text.
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Association of Data Processing Serv. Organi-
zations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970).
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Another source for answers is the statute regulating agency action
which is alleged to have been violated;3 but the common failure of
such statutes to deal with the matter of standing directly4 has com-
pelled the courts to resolve the questions. Judicial answers have
tended not to depend so much on the particular statutes involved,
but to rest on the creation and application of broad principles for
the interpretation of statutes generally.
Courts have begun to view standing as a preliminary matter,
perhaps because of the ordinary English implications of the term
"standing," as well as the fact that the most appropriate occasion
for determining the presence or absence of a case or controversy,
one of the obvious requirements for standing, is at the beginning of
a trial.5 Despite the tendency to view standing in this threshold
manner, it is often true that statutory answers to the "who may sue"
question, as well as to the "what arguments may he assert" ques-
tion, can only be determined by an investigation into the merits.'
Under the present law, however, standing is a threshold issue;7 as
a result, there is considerable doubt as to what is to be done with
those aspects of the first question which naturally go to the merits.8
Because the liberalization of the "who may sue" question and its
movement to the threshold have produced a group of litigants who
need to make arguments less related to themselves than once was
usual,9 the separation of the two questions is more complete, and the
second question more important.
Early Standing Cases: The Legal Right Test
The issue of standing to challenge administrative actions began
to assume importance in the 1890's, and in 1923 assumed major
3. See 3 DAvis § 22.03, at 213.
4. For instance, the judicial review provision of the Administrative Proced-
ure Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970), does not expressly mention standing.
5. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Hall v. Beals,
396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969).
6. For instance, statutory classifications, like businesses "affecting [interstate]
commerce," see, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970),
may produce disputed questions of fact. Yet statutes might intend to allow only
plaintiffs within such a classification to sue.
7. See notes 36-40, 45-50 infra and accompanying text.
8. Compare Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) and note 50
infra, with Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972)
and notes 165-82 infra and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 655 (1971).
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proportions in Frothingham v. Mellon.'0 In Frothingham, plaintiff,
a taxpayer, asked for an injunction against the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit allegedly illegal disbursements under a federal
welfare program. The Court held that the alleged injury, in the
form of increased taxes, was slight, and was not substantially con-
nected with the alleged illegality; furthermore, the Court found that
the constitutional guarantee whose benefit the plaintiff claimed had
not been intended to protect the taxpayer. Hence, the plaintiff lacked
standing to complain of these alleged violations of the Constitution.
Later, in two challenges to the TVA by competing private utili-
ties,' the Court used a similar analysis to deny the competitors the
right to rely on statutory prohibitions not designed to protect them.
Even though the companies had contended that the TVA had ex-
ceeded its statutory authority, the Court said that this authority had
not been limited in order to protect private utilities from competi-
tion. 2 Standing was thus said to depend on the infringement of a
protected legal right or interest belonging to the challenging party. 8
Standing was therefore not so much a mere threshold question
as a question going to the merits; the presence or absence of a
legal right determined both the standing issue and, in part, the even-
tual outcome.
Modifications to the Legal Right Test: Standing to Assert Jus Tertii
In other cases, however, the Court under certain circumstances
has allowed the assertion of what were frankly jus tertii. In the
1940's, in two cases involving the FCC, 4 the Supreme Court was
faced with a statute' 5 which granted a prospective licensee's competi-
tor the right to sue. The Court read this statute as authorizing the
assertion of the public interest by the competitors.' 0 Thus, while the
10. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others,
35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public
Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1961).
11. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
12. 306 U.S. at 139-40; see 302 U.S. at 478, 481.
13. 302 U.S. at 479-81 (1938). This requirement was, in fact, a restriction
on the right to raise jus tertii-the rights of third persons not parties to the litiga-
tion.
14. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
15. Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1093, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970).
16. 316 U.S. at 14; 309 U.S. at 476.
[V/ol. 1973:157
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1972
threat of economic injury created the case or controversy, the com-
petitor's right to assert jus tertii was dependent on the congressional
grant. A few years later, the Court in Barrows v. Jackson17 allowed
a white defendant to assert the constitutionally protected rights of
blacks to defeat an action on a racially restrictive covenant. This
holding was justified by the recognized need to allow the redress
of racial wrongs and the recognition that there was no way in which
the blacks injured by the discriminatory treatment could bring the
matter into court.18 Later, in NAACP v. Alabama,"9 the NAACP
was allowed to assert the constitutionally protected rights of its mem-
bers to freedom of association in order to preserve the anonymity of
those members. The success of a doctor's challenge to Connecticut's
birth control laws in Griswold v. Connecticut"' also depended, at
least in part, on the assertion of jus tertii-in this case, those rights
belonging properly to married couples who wanted to practice con-
traception.2 More recently, in a situation similar to that in Barrows,
the Court allowed the assertion of jus tertii, although with much less
discussion of the peculiar features of the case which compelled such
a result.22 Though these cases subsequent to Barrows tended to-
ward a liberalization of granting the right to assert jus tertii, the
cases still seemed to condition this grant on the existence of special
circumstances.23 In all of these cases the third parties would have
found it difficult to assert their constitutional rights themselves.
Flast and Kentucky Utilities: Legal Rights Inferred
The Court began its recent reconsideration of the standing-to-
sue problem with two cases-again a competitor's challenge to the
TVA, Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., and a federal taxpayer's
suit, Flast v. Cohen 25-neither of which, however, involved the as-
17. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
18. Id. at 257.
19. 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958).
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 481.
22. Sullivan v. little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). One of the plaintiffs
had been expelled from the Little Hunting Park corporation for attempting to transfer
a second share of ownership to a black, and for advocating the rights of the trans-
feree. The court held that a failure to grant this plaintiff standing "would give
impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on (real] property." Id. at 237.
23. "[We said in Barrows . . . that the white owner is at times 'the only ef-
fective adversary' of the unlawful restrictive covenant." 396 U.S. at 237.
24. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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sertion of rights of third parties. Because standing was granted to
the plaintiffs in both of these cases, the decisions were regarded as
liberalizations of the law of standing;26 however, the reasoning in
both nonetheless followed the Frothingharn line of cases. The first
case, Kentucky Utilities, depended on a 1959 amendment to the
TVA act 27 which clearly had as a major purpose the protection of
TVA's competitors.28 Consequently, the Court was willing to make
the inference that the private utilities had been given legal rights.
In Flast, the Court clarified Frothingham by recognizing that federal
taxpayers had a substantive right to challenge federal spending if two
conditions were met: the spending complained of had to be a sub-
stantial expenditure per se, rather than merely an expense incidental
to a regulatory program;2 9 and the alleged illegality had to be in
contravention of a direct curb put on the government for the taxpayers'
benefit, rather than an alleged over-extension of granted authority.80
Flast can be viewed as simply granting standing in the traditional
legal right sense-the right claimed in Flast was a taxpayer's right
and therefore was assertable; the right claimed in Frothingham was
jus tertii and therefore was not assertable.8' The emphasis the Court
put upon the particular constitutional clause as a measure designed
to protect taxpayers from excessive taxation 2 makes it clear that the
Court was attempting, under the heading of standing, to define the
26. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Clr. L. REv. 450, 452
(1970); Comment, Standing of Private Power Companies to Challenge Loan Grants
by the Rural Electrification Administration-A Failure to Apply the Rule in Hardin
v. Kentucky Utilities, 49 B.U.L. REv. 154, 158-59 (1969).
27. Pub. L. No. 86-137, § 1, 73 Stat. 280 (1959), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §
831n-4(a) (1970).
28. 390 U.S. at 6.
29. 392 U.S. at 102.
30. Id. at 102-03.
31. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldlan
or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. R~v. 1033, 1042 (1968). Jaffe discusses
possible outcomes in the then-pending Flast case in a manner which suggests strongly
that Frothingham does not foreclose establishment clause claims.
32. 392 U.S. at 103-04. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Similarly, the Third Cir-
cuit has recently allowed standing under the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 require-
ment that:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Ap-
propriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time.
This provision gave a taxpayer standing, under Flast and Data Processing, to chal-
lenge the government's failure to account for expenditures on the CIA. Richardson
v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 854 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3462
(U.S. Feb. 26, 1973).
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bounds of the plaintiffs legal right to complain of taxation-not
to define his right to assert the rights of others." In sum, the Court
in Flast had found that the increase in the plaintiffs tax burden
caused by the challenged program was an injury in fact to his inter-
ests, 4 and that there was a rational nexus between this personal
interest and the purpose of the statute or constitutional provision be-
ing asserted to protect it.35
Standing as a Threshold Question-Data Processing and Barlow
The two criteria of Flast reappeared, with one change, in the
two-pronged requirement for standing to challenge administrative
action established in Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp3 6 and in Barlow v. Collins.37 The Court held in
these cases that standing to bring suit-to cross the court's threshold
at all-depended on (1) establishing "injury in fact" (2) to an in-
terest "arguably" within a zone protected by the statutes the agency
is claimed to have violated. 8 The injury alleged in Data Processing
-a disadvantage felt by competitors of banks favored by a ruling
of the Comptroller of the Currency-was held sufficient to establish
an "injury in fact" arguably intended to be prevented by the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act.39 The injury in Barlow was a relaxation by
the Secretary of Agriculture of restrictions on the contractual assign-
ment of federal crop support payments by the farmer-recipient.4 °
The Court agreed with the farmers' contention that this relaxation ac-
tually allowed farmers' landlords to exert a more onerous hold over
the farmers, and that, at least arguably, rulemaking power had been
given the Secretary of Agriculture in order to allow him to protect
33. In contrast to the situation in Flast, in which only the clear history of the
establishment clause as a taxpayers' protection gave the plaintiff a legal right to
complain, is a case in which a defense is being raised to a direct order from a govern-
ment agency. When the agency attempts to enforce the order by legal action, a
claim that the agency has exceeded the authority granted to it is always assertable.
Thus the statute setting the bounds of the agency's authority is always considered
to be intended to protect those outside those bounds from legal compulsion.
34. 392 U.S. at 101-03.
35. Id.
36. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
37. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
38. 397 U.S. at 161; 397 U.S. at 152-53.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970).




farmers against this kind of oppression.41
These two cases, along with Flast and Kentucky Utilities, simply
served to broaden considerably the definition of an injury sufficient
to provide a case or controversy;4 2 Data Processing even spoke of
recognizing damage to esthetic or other non-economic interests.48
What was more significant, however, was the insertion of the quali-
fication "arguably" into what was essentially the old legal right test.
In Data Processing and Barlow the Court emphasized the
threshold aspects of standing. The government had claimed that
the plaintiff had no right even to be in court;44 consequently, the
Court was disposed to regard the government's legal right argument
as requiring a prejudgment on the merits.45 While in effect, the stand-
ing standards set forth in Flast were followed, the addition of the
qualification that the plaintiff's claim need only arguably fall within
a protected zone was natural for such a preliminary determination.
The Court insisted that the legal right test belonged in the determina-
tion on the merits,4 not in the determination of the plaintiff's right
to be in court at all. This insistence gave a strong indication that
once the merits were reached on remand, the plaintiff would have
to show one of three things. He would have to demonstrate either
(1) a legal right inhering in the statute as required by the Froth-
ingham-Flast line of cases, 47 or (2) an explicit grant of standing,
as in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,48 or (3) special circum-
41. 397 U.S. at 164-65. The Court ruled that the relevant statutes "expressly
enjoin" the Secretary to protect the interests of tenant farmers. Id. at 164.
42. See Davis, supra note 26, at 450-56.
43. 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
44. The district court had dismissed the complaints in Data Processing, see
397 U.S. at 151, and in Barlow, see 398 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. 397 U.S. at 153, 158.
46. "Whether anything in the [statutes] gives petitioners a 'legal interest' that
protects them against violations of those Acts ... [is a question) which go[es]
to the merits . . . ." 397 U.S. at 158. The distinction between arguably possess-
ing a legal interest-as a threshold question-and actually possessing one-as a
question for the merits-is not merely an ordinary differentiation between cases
which warrant dismissal and those which must be tried. Since FED. R. Civ. P. 56,
see notes 175-77 infra and accompanying text, allows adjudication before trial of
questions of law, presumably including those questions concerning the actual presence
of a legal interest, it would appear that the Court was concerned that dismissals for
lack of standing were being granted too summarily. To alleviate this concern, a
finding that a plaintiff arguably has a legal interest will demand that his case receive
consideration beyond a mere motion to dismiss.
47. See notes 10-13, 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
48. 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940). See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
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stances which, as in Barrows v. Jackson,49 would allow the assertion
of jus tertii. Of course, either of these latter two alternatives would
allow a plaintiff to circumvent the second prong of the Data Proc-
essing test entirelyY°
Sierra Club v. Morton-Does Threshold Standing Imply Standing to
Assert Jus Tertii?
Sierra Club v. Morton,5 a 1972 case, provides evidence that
Data Processing might represent a more revolutionary change in the
law of standing than had been immediately apparent. The Court in
Sierra held that the allegation that planned construction in an area of
great natural beauty injured the club's own-not its members-in-
terests in the environment 2 was insufficient to give the club standing
49. 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
50. In Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), the Court reached
the merits of a Data Processing type case. Standing had been granted to the plaintiff
to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that, in effect, allowed
commercial banks to operate mutual funds. Id. at 618-19. It was alleged that the
ruling violated various provisions of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act, including 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a) (1970). The Court through Justice Stewart characterized
the case, in its standing aspects, as following Data Processing: "[W]e concluded
[in Data Processing] that Congress had arguably legislated against the competition
that the petitioners sought to challenge, and from which flowed their injury. We
noted that whether Congress had indeed prohibited such competition was a ques-
tion for the merits." 401 U.S. at 620.
This description, couched in terms of prohibitions, rather than in terms of pro-
tected interests of the petitioner, amounts to an equation of the "zone of interests
intended to be protected" with all interests actually injured by the conduct
prohibited. The process described is simply a separation of summary judgment
from judgment on the merits: if taken literally, it grants standing on a showing
of injury in fact, subject to a dismissal not jurisdictional in nature, but for failure
to state a claim for which relief can be granted-this latter will occur only if the
injurious conduct is not even arguably prohibited. The case's merits are discussed
in a manner exactly consistent with this description. Id. at 629-39.
Since the act in question had been held arguably to have been intended to pro-
tect competitive interests in the Data Processing case, there is no way to deter-
mine whether Investment Co. Institute actually predicates jurisdictional, threshold
standing on injury in fact alone. Although Harlan's dissent, 401 U.S. at 639,
points out that plaintiffs are almost certainly without a protected legal interest,
the discussion on the merits makes no further mention of any intent on Congress'
part to protect the interests of competitors like the plaintiff. If this case with its
peculiar description of the Data Processing standard is to be taken at face value,
apparently a showing of a legal interest is no longer required in order to succeed
on the merits. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972), however, reaf-
firmed Data Processing's exact language.
51. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
52. 405 U.S. at 735 n.8,
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to sue. In Sierra, the government proposed to allow Walt Disney
Enterprises to construct a recreational development in part of a na-
tional forest in California." The club sought injunctions forbidding
the federal officials involved from allowing the project to proceed.
It based its right to bring the suit on the judicial review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 4 alleging that it was an organi-
zation one of whose purposes and special interests was the protec-
tion of natural resources, and that the proposed project interfered
with this purpose and injured this interest55 The club claimed that
the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior had violated
federal laws protecting the National Forests and National Parks 0
as well as regulations requiring public hearings,5 7 and further con-
tended that both agencies had exceeded their grants of authority.5s
The Sierra Club apparently felt that it would be unable to
show the special circumstances required by the Barrows line of cases
for the assertion of rights of third parties. Thus the club's ability
to raise public interest matters as jus tertii5" would be limited. At
the same time, the new liberalized standing standards announced in
Data Processing and Barlow must have suggested that the club
might obtain standing to assert the public interest, or at least to use
similarly broad arguments in its own right.10 The requirement that
the interests alleged to be injured be within the protected zone of
the statutory or constitutional guarantee relied upon apparently made
the club feel, as a corollary, that too particularized an allegation of
injury would result in a restriction on the possibility of raising broad
public interest arguments, 6' as well as perhaps making it difficult
for it to obtain a preliminary injunction. 2  Consequently, the club
53. The $35 million project involved extensive construction on 80 acres of the
valley floor, and general opening and development of other parts of the valley
with ski-lifts and trails, and a cog-railway. The project also required an access
road and an electrical transmission line to the valley across part of Sequoia Na-
tional Park. 405 U.S. at 729.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See 405 U.S. at 730, 732.
55. 405 U.S. at 734-35, 735 n.8.
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41, 43, 45c, 497 (1970); see 405 U.S. at 730 n.2.
57. 405 U.S. at 730 n.2. But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 37 (9th
Cir. 1970), af'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
58. 405 U.S. at 730 n.2; 433 F.2d at 34-38.
59. See 405 U.S. at 740 n.15.
60. See Davis, supra note 26, at 450-56.
61. See 405 U.S. at 740 n.15.
62. See 433 F.2d at 33 where the Ninth Circuit spoke about balancing the dam-
age to both parties.
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restricted itself to claiming that the project would injure the organi-
zation's own general interest in the environment. The Court, how-
ever, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, held that this allegation of in-
jury to the club's self-claimed interest and concern was not a suffi-
cient allegation of injury in fact to justify granting standing to sue.63
Essentially, the case turned on a decision that an organization cannot
have its esthetic sensibilities disturbed.64
More important, perhaps, than the holding itself, was a point the
Court made fairly clear in dictum.6 5  The Court intimated that the
question of standing to sue will be considered quite separately from
the question of standing to assert the rights of the public. In foot-
note 15, the Court stated that "[o]nce this standing is established,
the party may assert the interests of the general public in support of
his claims for equitable relief." 6
Footnote 15 is subject to two general categories of interpreta-
tion. The broader view, liberalizing standing as much as possible,
takes the language at face value. The narrower view is that some
restriction in addition to applying the Data Processing test on a single
issue will be placed on grants of standing to assert the public interest.
The Broad Reading of Footnote 15
Under the broad view, while standing to sue must be gained
by a satisfaction of the two-pronged Data Processing test, an organi-
zation, once in court, apparently may assert any public rights or
complain of any violation of any mandate directed at the agency in
question. In making its apparently sweeping statement,6 7 the Court
depended heavily on FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station6" and
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC.69 The reference to these two
63. 405 U.S. at 734-35.
64. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 237 (1972), 43
Miss. L.J. 538, 541-42 (1972). See text accompanying note 43 supra.
65. In environmental lawsuits, at least, organizations like the Sierra Club will
have little trouble gaining standing for themselves if they merely allege injuries to
their members. 405 U.S. at 735. The Court did not foreclose the possibility that
an organization might itself suffer injury-perhaps economically-and gain stand-
ing in that manner.
66. 405 U.S. at 740 n.15: "The test of injury in fact goes only to the ques-
tion of standing to obtain judicial review. Once this standing is established, the
party may assert the interests of the public in support of his claims for equitable
relief." See also 39 BRooKLYN L. REV. 492, 500 (1972).
67. 405 U.S. at 727, 740 n.15.
68. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
69. 316 U.S. 4 (1942). See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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cases is rather peculiar. Like Flast and Kentucky Utilities,70 the
standing granted in Sanders Brothers and Scripps-Howard had de-
pended on the construction of particular statutes which were found to
authorize the plaintiffs in those cases to bring suit71 and present argu-
ments based on the rights of third parties. Thus, the Sierra Court's
use of these cases to demonstrate, in footnote 15, that standing, once
granted, allows a plaintiff to make any argument whatsoever,7 2 cer-
tainly strains their holdings.73
The Narrow Reading of Footnote 15
This apparent problem with the Court's use of precedent, to-
gether with the peculiar circumstances 74 of the Sierra case and of the
hypothetical situation set up in footnote 15,75 may indicate that the
Court's language there ought not be taken at its face value. Possibly
Data Processing's implication that a legal interest must be shown
on the merits is still the law.7 6  Perhaps footnote 15 indicates only
that the Court thinks that the Sierra Club, by asserting the rights of
its members, would effectively assert the rights of the public be-
70. See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
71. In Sanders Brothers and Scripps-Howard, the law is the Communications
Act of 1934 § 402(b) (2), ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402
(b) (6) (1970); in Flast, U.S. CONST. amend. I; in Kentucky Utilities, 16 U.S.C.
§ 831n-4(a) (1970).
72. The Court pointed out that the statutes involved in Sanders Brothers and
Scripps-Howard granted the right to assert jus tertii to any plaintiff who, by show-
ing injury in fact, could take advantage of the express statutory grant of standing.
405 U.S. at 737. Later in the opinion, however, the Court apparently refers to this
result as correct when plaintiffs have gained threshold standing by passing the
Data Processing test, or at least when they have gained standing without an express
statutory grant. Id. at 740 n.15. Perhaps a suggestion can be found, however,
that the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), provides this
grant to assert jus terti but only if the Data Processing interpretation of the APA's
standing standards is satisfied. 405 U.S. at 733.
73. Nevertheless, this language may indicate that court-granted standing to sue
will be considered on a par with Congressionally-granted standing to assert jus tertii.
A right to assert jus tertii, embodied in a statute, could be said to grant a legal
right itself. DAvis § 22.09-6, at 752 (Supp. 1970). See also 4 DAviS § 22.05, at
225-26 (1958). However, this interpretation con cts with the older standing
cases, which had indicated that a legal right was to arise only when Congress so in-
tended. See notes 10-13, 24-31 supra and accompanying text.
74. The public interests the club wished to assert were quite parallel with
those of its members-who, of course, were also members of the public. See note
84 infra and accompanying text.
75. Once having demonstrated the requirement for threshold standing, the plain-
tiff could assert the rights of the public. See note 66 supra.
76. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
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cause of the unusual situation. For example, the Barrows exception
might be thought to apply. Or perhaps, because the members' rights
and the public's were identical, the public's rights would in effect
be asserted.
Intermediate Interpretations of Footnote 15
The two extremes-that passing the Data Processing test al-
lows the assertion of any argument, or that the legal interest test must
still be applied on the merits-are not the only possible interpretations
of footnote 15 in Sierra. Because the Court depends in its footnote
15 77 on such easily distinguishable cases as Sanders Brothers and
Scripps-Howard,78 and because the dictum of the Sierra Court in
footnote 15 goes farther than would be necessary to assure the Sierra
Club and organizations like it that they need not fear entrapment
into restricted arguments by alleging particular injuries,79 it would
seem reasonable to suppose that the Court might think it necessary in
a later case to limit its sweeping language80 If this occurs, the
77. 405 U.S. at 740 n.15. See note 66 supra and ac.companying text.
78. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
79. Almost any of the more restrictive schemes, see notes 83-96 infra and
accompanying text, would have still allowed the club to have asserted the public's
rights.
80. A further suggestion that there may be limitations on the blanket language
in Sierra indicating that parties with standing can raise jus tertii, can be found in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). There, a black plaintiff who
had been refused service at the Moose Lodge complained both of the Lodge's policies
with respect to guests and of its membership policies. He was denied standing on
this latter half of his complaint, because he had not himself been injured by the
membership policies.
Since the plaintiff was not injured by these policies, the Court was able to dis-
tinguish this case from Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The reference
to Barrows in Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 166-67, is fortified with a mention of Sierra:
a case, the Court said, which "referred to a similar relationship between the standing
of the plaintiff and the argument of which he might avail himself . . . ." Id. at
167 n.1, citing 405 U.S. at 737. While this might simply mean that the Court felt
Moose Lodge and Sierra were similar in refusing to grant a party uninjured by an
(arguably) state or agency action standing to challenge that particular action, the
placement of the note on a citation of Barrows as an exceptional case may mean
that both in Barrows and in the hypothetical single-private-party-plaintiff situation
the Court discussed in Sierra, 405 U.S. at 740 n.15, were exceptional in having
plaintiffs who wished to assert jus tertii in a way peculiarly parallel to their own
interests and wishes. Their reason for wanting relief, or the sort of injury which
they suffered, was closely related to the reasons the third party or the public ought
to have relief, or the type of injury the public was claimed to have suffered. Thus
the defendant in Barrows was prevented from selling, and blacks were prevented
from buying property by racially restrictive covenants. See 346 U.S. at 258. Doe-
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Court would then be granting a restricted right to assert jus tertii, and
the form the restrictions took would depend on the theoretical basis
the Court has in mind when allowing this assertion of the rights of
others.
One of these potential bases begins with the injury to the plain-
tiff, and depends on similarity between this injury and the injury
to the public. A second basis springs from the common-law right
to raise public policy in equity courts."' A third is the desire to allow
plaintiffs in such suits an opportunity to counteract defendants'
public-interest-based arguments."2 It is clear that the latter two bases
could operate independently of the first-that is, a plaintiff failing to
meet the prerequisites of similarity of injury needed to assert public
rights could still be allowed, under the latter bases, to assert the public
right to some degree.
Similarity of Injury
The first basis begins with the injury to the plaintiff's interest for
which he is seeking redress.83 This basis seeks to differentiate between
raising the public interest to buttress a parallel interest of the plaintiff,
and in raising it when there is only an identity between the result which
the public interest suggests and the result desired by the plaintiff.
The former instance is illustrated by the obviously parallel relation-
ship between the kinds of public interests which the Sierra Club
tors asserting their patients' rights in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
seems to be a similar situation. The members of the Sierra Club were told that they
,could have asserted the rights of non-members who were injured in the same ways
that they were. This sort of restriction might have the effect of ensuring that the
public's interests were asserted only by those whose similar posture made them
more likely to be good representatives. Even if this latter view is an incorrect in-
terpretation, the connection required in Moose Lodge between the injury com-
plained of and the redress sought, and the public policy argument which can be
raised, 407 U.S. at 166, allow the inference of a requirement that the thrust of the
redress sought must further both the plaintiff's wishes and the public policy pro-
pounded. This statement of the principle might include a corollary that allows
complainants to argue a public policy only as long as the particular redress he re-
quests in fact furthers that policy.
81. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); Vir-
ginian Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, AFL, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937); M. Steinthal &
Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
82. See 405 U.S. at 740 n.15, where the Court quotes the Sierra Club's fear that
its assertions of private injury only will be outweighed by the government's asser-
tions of public interest. See also Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 30 (1970),
aff'd sub nor. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
83. See 397 U.S. at 154.
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wished to raise and the kinds of private interests belonging to its
members which the Court says the club would have had standing to
assert.84  The injuries were identical. Both sets of claims would
have relied on the same protective purposes being found in the stat-
ute. The distinction is one more of breadth and weight of argument
than of kind. As direct a connection as was present between plain-
tiff's and public claims in Sierra might not be required, but the argu-
ment can always be made that the plaintiff whose injury is related
to the public's is a better advocate for the interests of the public.8 5
There are two places at which this parallelism can be measured.
The injuries to the plaintiff and the public can be similar, or the gov-
ernmental prohibition protecting the public and the plaintiff from
the same act can be related. Under this theory a plaintiff claiming
that both he and the public suffered environmental injury from an
agency's violation of a statute intended, or arguably intended, to pro-
tect both of them from this kind of injury can assert both parties'
rights. 80 But suppose the agency has violated one statute, designed
to protect the public or a third party but not the plaintiff from this
injury, and by the same act violates another statute which does pro-
tect the plaintiff. Will the identity of injury allow the plaintiff to
complain of the breach of the first statute? Or suppose the agency's
act violates a statute arguably intended both to protect the plaintiff
from economic harm and the public from environmental injury. 7
Does the identity of agency act and statutory prohibition obviate the
need for any connection between the injuries?
84. 405 U.S. at 739.
85. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). But Professor Davis con-
tends that the law of standing cannot and ought not be used to insure the compe-
tent presentation of cases. DAvis § 22.00-4, at 723-24 (Supp. 1970). There is,
however, a danger that a non-interested plaintiff may, either collusively or accident-
ally, frame issues in such a way that interests of persons not parties to the action
are not apparent to the court. Of course, this is always a danger when a case in-
volving three or more opposing interests is litigated between two of them. The gen-
eral public, however, might warrant special protetion-if its interests could be
identified.
86. A corporation alleging economic injury of a particular kind might be able
to challenge agency action causing such injury by virtue of a statute designed only
to protect corporations. Can it therefore also assert injury to natural persons, and
complain of violation of statutes designed to protect these members of the public,
but not corporations, from this injury?
87. Suppose the Sierra Club had contended that its economic interest in having
as many dues-paying members as possible was injured by the defendants' actions in
Sierra. If the statutes involved had been construed arguably to protect the club
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Public Policy Arguments in Equity
Any restricted system of determining what the plaintiff can ar-
gue on the merits, from one using the legal right test up through one
which might arise from a more liberal interpretation of Sierra, could
be broadened by allowing public interest to be argued as a make-
weight.8 8 Once a plaintiff had made a case satisfying the require-
ments of the restricting system-that is, shown a protected interest
of his own, or, if allowed, a protected interest of the public which
is sufficiently related to his own injured interest-he could, in an
equity court, add other unrelated public arguments pointing to the
same result.
Sierra's dictum could be read most restrictively to indicate that
the public interest can be asserted by a plaintiff only after he has
shown a protected interest of his own.89 The ability to use make-
weight arguments is still particularly important because the redress
sought in suits challenging administrative action is ordinarily equi-
table in nature. Consequently, courts will be disposed not only to
determine whether the relevant statutes protect the plaintiff, but
whether they warrant giving the remedy sought. Because Sierra
was one of these suits for injunction,90 the discussion in Sierra about
raising arguments of public interest might more easily be interpreted
from this kind of injury, then could the club have asserted the public's right, un-
der the same statutes, to be free of environmental injury?
88. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
89. A rule of this sort would mean that a plaintiff who passed the Data Pro-
cessing test, but whose "arguable" legal interest was shown in law not to exist in a
FE. R. Civ. P. 56 adjudication of the legal merits could go no farther by asserting
the public's rights. A plaintiff successful on the merits could, as always, assert
public interest to support his claim for a particular equitable remedy. If his
claim were at law only, the public interest might be allowed to support his case more
directly than has heretofore been the case-with public interest being asserted as
evidence of Congress' probable intent. If a plaintiff after trial has failed to pass the
full old-style standing test-proven his injury in fact to a legally protected in-
terest by an action not committed to agency discretion by law-because of a failure
to prove facts alleged, ought a court adjudicate the claim on the basis of public
interest issues already litigated? This question could be answered yes or no, or the
matter could be left to the court's discretion. If this decision is to be left to the
trial court, at least three factors can be named which ought expressly to affect its deci-
sion: (1) the effect on the public of delay while waiting for a new advocate, (2)
whether the plaintiff had made false allegations of fact in order to get into court,
and (3) whether it was likely that the public interest issues had been litigated in
a manner which fully revealed their true nature.
90. 405 U.S. at 731; id. at 740 n.15: "... in support of his claims for equit-
able relief' (emphasis added).
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to mean merely that a plaintiff who has passed the Data Processing
test and gone on to show on the merits that he has a protected legal
right can then use other arguments based on other protected inter-
ests, perhaps including the public's, to show that the particular re-
dress he is seeking is warranted. However, this most restricted in-
terpretation seems less in accord with the Court's actual language."1
It might be noted, though, that requiring a close connection between
the injury to the public and the injury to the plaintiff, which might
seem a natural qualification, would tend to operate in the same man-
ner as the makeweight rule. If the public has a protected interest,
the plaintiff's very similar interest is likely to be protected also.92
So the plaintiff would generally be able only to use public interest to
show that redress of injuries to his own legally protected rights was
warranted. Perhaps the Court had this result in mind, but was un-
willing to decide immediately which theory ought to be used to achieve
the result.
Counteracting the Government's Public-Interest-Based Arguments
Another restriction on the right to assert the public's rights,
which probably would not have prevented the Sierra Club from doing
so in this case, would be to allow public interest arguments only as
counterweights to similarly directed arguments by the government.9 3
If the Sierra Court had this restricted reading of footnote 15 in mind
or later wishes to restrict it, the dictum could be read to mean that
once a plaintiff has full, legal interest standing to complain of the
violation of a particular statute by a government agency, he need
not, in the face of a government public policy argument, restrict
himself to presenting only the contrary policy preventing injury to
him, but may rebut the government's arguments on an equivalent
front. Thus, a restriction of the plaintiff to public interest arguments
91. "The test of injury in fact goes only to the question of standing to obtain
judicial review. Once this standing is established, the party may assert the inter-
ests of the general public in support of his claims for equitable relief." Id. at 740
n.15 (emphasis added). See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
92. For example, in a Sierra-type situation, the interests both of the club mem-
bers and of members of the general public in using the National Forest would be
protected, if at all, by the same laws, and in an identical manner.
93. See note 82 supra. At least a failure to allow plaintiffs to counteract
a government argument-that great numbers of skiers would be benefited by the
proposed construction-with one of their own-that a great many members of the
public unassociated with the Sierra Club would prefer to use the site in question
in its natural state--seems unfair.
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parallel to his own might well have an exception allowing other argu-
ments in the public interest to be raised if the government chose to
do so.
There is, however, one defect in relying too much on this third
basis. Because the government's interest includes protecting the
public generally, it can always raise public interest arguments of its
own-but it might not choose to do so in every instance. Allowing
the government to choose whether or not to restrict the lawsuit to
the particular grounds the plaintiff originally urged seems, however,
to give the government an option which might often hinder rather
than help the resolution of lawsuits in a manner truly consistent with
the public interest.9
All of the broader interpretations of Sierra which allow the as-
sertion of jus terti without application of the legal right test, have a
peculiar feature. The plaintiff's own injury need only be shown to
have arguably been intended to be prevented, and need never show
that it was actually so intended; consequently, the merits of the case
could be carried by arguments having nothing to do with the plain-
tiff himself. This result seems curious, since it requires as part of a
case that a point of law be shown only arguably. Would such an in-
terpretation mean that the plaintiff need place himself only arguably
close to the interests held protected in the legal right days?"' Or is a
new law of arguable interpretations of statutes to be developed for
the purpose?96
94. Allowing such an option compounds the problems mentioned in note 85
supra which arise when more different and competing interests are involved in the
resolution of a lawsuit than there are parties. When the public interest is asserted,
these problems are particularly critical, because the "public interest" is in fact a
sheaf of interests belonging to members of the public-and all these members' in-
terests are unlikely to be exactly the same.
95. See text accompanying notes 172-73 inIra.
Springfield Television, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 462 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1972),
presented a related and striking aspect of this problem. Plaintiff had challenged the
grant by the city of a CATV license to a competitor. A claim that the area had
been preempted by the FCC, stipulated out at the trial stage of the case, was held
by the Eighth Circuit to present a justiciable federal claim pendant to which relief
could be granted on state grounds. The court held that the plaintiff had had stand-
ing to assert the preemption claim, quoting Data Processing and Investment Co. In-
stitute. While here the plaintiff probably had legal-interest standing to assert the
preemption issue-the court said within the zone of interest, not arguably within-
it is clear that a relaxation of standing standards to include the "arguably" would
give a much wider range of hooks on which to hang pendant claims. Id. at 23.
96. Fear has often been expressed that excessive liberalization of standing re-
quirements may result in excessive litigation or in litigation not competently con-
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STANDING TO ASSERT THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
CHALLENGING THE AWARD OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Introduction
Competitors' suits to overturn the award of government con-
tracts present a particularly troublesome aspect of the standing prob-
lem. The varied purposes of statutes regulating procurement, as
those of any statute, may not always be clear, and the degree to
which the complaining contractor's interests parallel those of the pub-
lic often depends heavily on the facts of each case. The concentra-
tion of the Data Processing test on the relationship between the statute
and the complaining party,97 however, sets this sort of third-party
attack on government contracts into an easily separable set of cases. 98
ducted or not diligently pursued. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93-98
(1968). The careful restrictions in Flast placed on the taxpayer's right to chal-
lenge government spending, id. at 102-03, may be an example of an attempt to avoid
excessive litigation. It may be that the failure in Sierra to extend standing fur-
ther, by liberalizing the injury-in-fact test, is an indication that injury in fact
rather than zone of interest will be the more important issue in standing-to-sue
questions. Justices Brennan and White, concurring in Data Processing and dis-
senting in Barlow, suggested that injury in fact be the only test of standing. 397
U.S. 159, 167-73 (1970). Professor Davis supports this view. DAvis § 22.21
(Supp. 1970).
It is possible, of course, to use either test as a basic means of limiting the
parties allowed to sue in specific situations. The two tests are not strictly parallel,
but because statutes are ordinarily directed at preventing some kind of rather ob-
vious injury, a strict view of what courts would be willing to regard as an injury in
fact might often have the same result as a restricted view of the protected zone.
Before Data Processing, for instance, competitive disadvantage could have been
regarded as no injury in fact. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text. Cf.
DAvis § 22.21, at 784-85 (Supp. 1970). This would have produced the same result
as though statutes were generally read not to intend to protect against competitive
disadvantage. Members of the Court have suggested that some of the problems of
excessive litigation or inappropriate parties might be avoided by making the ap-
propriateness of a party bringing a public interest lawsuit a separate considera-
tion to be used as a weighting factor in granting standing. See 405 U.S. at 757-60
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since injury in fact is usually not subject to exact
measurement, even when purely economic, it is clear that either case by case discre-
tion or differentiation between different sorts of lawsuits can and probably will
be attached to this determination. Such discrimination could be consciously or un-
consciously based on this "competence" criteria. Furthermore, the detrimental ef-
fects of partially settling issues by incomplete litigation or litigation incompetently
conducted, or of settling issues too quickly, could be ameliorated by relaxing the
effects of res judicata in fields such as environmental litigation where issues tend
to be extremely complex and interconnected in not always obvious ways.
97. See notes 36-39 supra and 129-32 infra and accompanying text.
98. "[S]tanding may stem from [noneconomic values] as well as from the eco-
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Although competitors' suits would seem to require consistent treat-
ment, the courts have not yet settled the questions involved. An ex-
amination of varying approaches to government contracts cases re-
veals some of the means by which the Supreme Court's new law of
standing may be implemented.
A problem which arises often in government contracts cases is
the degree to which the relief sought by the contractor will actually
further the public interest. Although not arising in this context,
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis0 indicates that the redress sought
must be relief for plaintiff's own injuries, not the public's. °00 A
corollary which might be inferred from Moose Lodge is that the
public interest will support the redress for the plaintiff only when,
on the whole, the public is also benefited. This corollary could be
applied to competitors' suits with varying degrees of rigor. At one
extreme, it might mean that a low-bidding contractor could not com-
plain, on grounds of public expense, of an award to higher priced
competition once the costs of reletting the contract exceeded the
savings a new award to the plaintiff would accomplish. The valuable
results of this requirement might also be accomplished, without so
much restrictive rigor, by requiring that in equitable actions chal-
lenging contracts, the whole public interest always be considered
and a balancing test employed before an injunction could issue. This
technique would flow naturally from an emphasis on the second,
public-policy-as-makeweight basis for allowing the addition of Sierra-
type arguments not so connected with the plaintiff. 1 1 Emphasizing
the connection between the plaintiff and his argument breeds techni-
cal distinctions;102 but a system concentrating on restricting plaintiffs
to those with some legal rights, while allowing those plaintiffs to as-
sert the public interest, separates these technical issues from the pub-
lic policy questions. Such a system would also allow a broad and
balanced consideration of the effects of the court's proposed action
on the public. 0 3
nomic injury on which petitioners rely here." 397 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
In all these cases the injury to the contractors would be similar.
99. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
100. Id. at 164-65. See note 80 supra for a discussion of this case.
101. See notes 81, 88 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
103. Thus a contractor, faced with an argument that transferring a contract to
him at a late stage would cost the government more than it would save, might
counter with a claim that the increased faith that contractors would have in the
procurement process might save the public money in the long run. The contracting
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Used in a broader sense, the requirement that the redress asked
for must in fact further the public interest before public policy can
be asserted is an implicit limitation springing from the use of a
full balancing test on public policy arguments. Stated as a require-
ment, however, its operation as a limitation on the remedies which
can be prayed for in suits of this nature is emphasized. This is a
limitation which can perhaps be inferred from Sierra.10 4
The important point is that this perfectly natural and appar-
ently desirable limitation can be imposed without technical consid-
erations as to which plaintiffs can make which arguments. And there
are indications that courts are beginning, implicitly at least, to take
this approach'0 05-to view broadly the public policy implications of
the decision in order to temper the effect of a liberalization of re-
strictions on the range of arguments plaintiffs can assert.
The Traditional Rule-Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.
The traditional rule that government contractors had no right
to challenge procurement procedures was articulated in 1940, in
agency might then respond that the redress sought would operate mostly as a penalty
against it, and that, it being presumably unnecessary to penalize agencies to make
them obey the law, in the balance, the public would be best served by leaving the
contractor remediless.
104. The requirement of injury in fact does not "prevent any public interests
from being protected through the judicial process." 405 U.S. at 740. This is the
statement to which footnote 15 is a footnote. Footnote 15 itself seems to assume
that the government will assert its version of the public interest fully.
105. See notes 146, 151-53, 162-63, 182, 192 inIra and accompanying text. Of
course, all a court is doing when it determines whether a particular procurement
statute arguably either does or does not protect the interests of losing bidders is
establishing a presumption. It is quite clear that Congress could, by explicit lan-
guage, grant standing to losing contractors; it is equally clear that the application of
statutory standards in procurement can, by explicit language, be left to the absolute
discretion of the procuring agency. Although utterly fraudulent conduct or blatant
bribery might still be grounds for a losing bidder's attack, a statute written to leave
an agency with complete discretion would render most cases futile. Because it would
be possible for Congress to pass a statute expressly leaving its operation to agency
discretion, it would also seem reasonable that it could do so by implication alone.
Such a statute could be properly applied by courts if they were willing to consider
its zone of protected interests at a more exacting level than that indicated by a
qualification "arguably"-as a question of standing or one on the merits. The Su-
preme Court has, however, indicated perhaps that the legal interest test is not to
be applied on the merits, see notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text, and the
arguably protected interest which must be shown to warrant a grant of threshold
standing can be demonstrated by rather tenuous processes. See notes 133-41
infra and accompanying text. The reservation in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
237
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Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.08 In Lukens Steel, the Supreme Court
found that the statute which was claimed to have been violated by the
government agency conferred no legal right on the plaintiffs. There-
fore, no invasion of a legal right arose from the prospective damage
and loss of income. The Court stated: "Respondents, to have
standing in court, must show an injury or threat to a particular right
of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the admin-
istration of the law.' '107 Until 1970, Lukens Steel stood without chal-
lenge as the leading case in this area. 08
Does the APA Make a Losing Bidder a Private Attorney General-
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer
In 1970, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit broke with the Lukens Steel rule in Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer.10 9  The plaintiff, the second lowest bidder on an
FAA contract, claimed that the bid of the lowest bidder was non-
responsive" and sought a declaration that the award of the contract
to the low bidder was void. Disturbed by the apparent circularity
of the notion of the early standing cases that standing to sue re-
quired the possession of a legal right-that is, that standing de-
pended on a question going to the merits-the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit"' attempted to assess whether Lu-
kens Steel was still accurately reflective of the law of standing at the
time of the Scanwell decision. 1 2 The court began this assessment
by contrasting the cases on which the early standing concept was based
-Frothingham v. Mellon,"' The Chicago Junction Case,"14 Tennes-
(1970), concerning cases where statutes expressly deny standing, as a separate cate-
gory, id. at 165, and the requirement that the language in them denying standing be
explicit, id., probably means that the Supreme Court will not read any presumption
of a denial of standing into a statute which does not mention it.
106. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
107. Id. at 125.
108. See Note, Standing to Challenge Agency Action by Bidders on Government
Contracts, 19 U. KAN. L. Rnv. 558, 559 (1971).
109. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
110. The FAA's criteria for bids included a requirement that bidders propose only
systems of which there existed at least one operational example. Scanwell con-
tended that its competitor's bid was non-responsive to the advertisement for failure
to meet this criterion. Id. at 860. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.404-2(a) (1972).
111. The court in Scanwell quotes 3 DAvis § 22.04, at 217 on this point. 424
F.2d at 861.
112. See notes 24-35 supra and accompanying text.
113. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
114. 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
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see Electric Power Co. v. TVA"- 5-with the line of cases which had
developed the concept of the private attorney general-FCC v.
Sanders Brothers Radio Station"1 6 and Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.
v. FCC 17 in the Supreme Court and Associated Industries v. Ickes" 8
in the court of appeals. The Scanwell court noted that the latter
group depended on statutes which were read to authorize specifically
a right to bring suit and to assert the public interest by plaintiffs
injured by allegedly illegal government action,1"" and that these
plaintiffs were otherwise without any legal interest protected by the
statutes in question. The Scanwell court then considered section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act,120 under which the plaintiff's
suit had been brought. It felt that language in Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co.12' and in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner12' -both
cases which had granted standing without express statutory provi-
sion' 243-indicated that the District of Columbia court's earlier belief
that the APA had been reflective of the law existing at the time of
its passage 24 was incorrect.:2 5  A review of other more recent
cases,' L2 both its own and those of the Supreme Court, indicated to
the Scanwell court that the law of standing was being relaxed.2 7
It concluded that these developments indicated that the APA ought
to be read as granting standing to any person, so long as he can al-
115. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
116. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
117. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
118. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
119. Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970); Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, §
6, 50 Stat. 85 (repealed 1966).
120. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). The court quoted APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1970): "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 424 F.2d at 865.
121. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
122. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
123. See notes 24-33 supra and accompanying text.
124. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
125. 424 F.2d at 865-66, 872.
126. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
357 U.S. 77 (1958); National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83
(D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Air Reduction
Co. v. iEckel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
127. 424 F.2d at 872.
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lege injury in fact from administrative action 2 -- that is, the APA
was to be regarded as making private attorneys general of injured
parties. Presumably, on remand the district court was to regard this
private attorney general concept as allowing the plaintiff to raise pub-
lic interest issues on the merits. In essence, the legal right require-
ment would be applied neither in a consideration of standing nor in
a decision on the merits.
Data Processing and Barlow-The Scanwell Rationale Undercut
Shortly after Scanwell, the Supreme Court construed the stand-
ing aspects of the APA in Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations, Inc. v. Camp'29 and Barlow v. Collins. °30 Signifi-
cantly, the private attorney general reading, and the concomitant
notion that standing depended only on asserting injury in fact, were
not adopted. Instead, Justice Douglas outlined the two-pronged
standing test: injury in fact is a constitutional requirement; the other
requirement is that the plaintiffs interest be arguably within the zone
intended to be protected by the statute in question.' 13 The Court
made use of the argument that the legal right test went to the merits
and was thus inappropriate for settling a preliminary question of
standing. 32 This argument seemed to suggest that the legal interest
test remained in force, but that it would only have to be satisfied by
the plaintiff at a trial of the merits.
The Scanwell Result Via the Data Processing Test-Blackhawk and
Ballerina
Despite the fact that Scanwells private attorney general reading
of the APA was repudiated, the District of Columbia Circuit was
unwilling to abandon the Scanwell result. Blackhawk Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Driver'38 reached the D.C. Circuit after the Data
Processing and Barlow decisions. In Blackhawk, the court applied
Scanwell in modified form, saying that the standing threshold being
used was Data Processing's two-pronged test, rather than Scanwell's
original requirement of injury in fact only.'3 4  In Blackhawk, the
plaintiff contractor was held to have satisfied the Data Processing
128. Id.
129. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
130. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
131. 397 U.S. at 151, 153.
132. See id. at 153. See notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
133. 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
134. Id. at 1140.
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test, but no discussion was made as to how the "arguably within the
zone of protected interests" branch of this test had been met.'" 5
Furthermore, the subsequent discussion of the merits of the plain-
tiff's case made no mention of any application of a legal right test.
The court seemed to feel that the contracting officer had acted within
the discretion given him by the relevant regulation. 13 6 This discus-
sion implies that the plaintiff had a legal right to challenge a breach"3 7
of the regulations. But Lukens Steel probably would not have al-
lowed the plaintiff here to pass the legal right test.88  In short,
there is no indication that either as a matter of jurisdiction or on
the merits, contractors would have to show that laws whose protec-
tion they invoke were intended to benefit them. Only the most lib-
eral reading of Sierra,39 which came down after these cases, would
support this use of Data Processing's threshold standing test as the
sole requirement before jus tertii might be asserted.
In Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig,140 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit discussed the matter somewhat less
cursorily, saying that the "arguably within the zone of protected in-
terests" test was satisfied by showing that the legislative history of the
statute claimed to have been violated demonstrated a concern for the
adequate protection of competitors. The court did, however, at
one point quote a passage from Scanwell which tended to indicate
that, despite Data Processing, the court felt that the APA created a
right for the aggrieved parties to act as private attorneys general in
government contract situations without regard to the zones of inter-
est protected by other statutes which were claimed to have been vio-
lated. '4
Limitations on the Scanwell Result-Steinthal and Wheelabrator
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans142 and Wheelabrator Corp. v.
135. See id. at 1140-41.
136. See id. at 1143-44. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1310-7 (1970).
137. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1310-7 (1970).
138. See notes 106-08 supra and accompanying text.
139. That is, the liberal interpretation of footnote 15, 405 U.S. at 740 n.15, that
plaintiffs after showing Data Processing standing on the threshold may attempt to
carry the merits with any argument whatsoever. See notes 45, 53 supra and accom-
panying text.
140. 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
141. Id. at 1216 n.18 (1970), quoting 424 F.2d at 872; cf. 433 F.2d at 1140
n.2.
142. 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Chafee43 marked a partial retrenchment from the interventionist at-
titude of the District of Columbia Circuit.' 44 Steinthal involved a
bidder's complaint of prejudice from a readvertisement for bids.
Both the contracting agency and the GAO had found the original
advertisement to be ambiguous. 4  Standing was granted, but the
district court's order for an injunction was reversed. The reversal
was based on a regard for administrative determinations made in
proper exercise of discretion, as well as a notion that assertions of
claims in the public interest must be based on an accurate reflection
of that interest.:'46 The court mentioned the availability of a pro-
ceeding for damages in the Court of Claims as an alternative which
would allow a more leisurely review of the problem and interfere
less with the operation of governmental activities dependent on the
questioned procurement. 4 7
Wheelabrator involved a similar situation. A manufacturer
claimed that the Navy had chosen an improper method of letting a
contract. However, the statutes did not forbid the discretionary use
of the chosen procedure, though they required it in certain other situ-
ations.' 48 The court held that it could not intervene unless an alle-
gation, such as fraud or bribery, were made that undercut the "bona
fide defense that the matter rests solely within the Secretary's dis-
cretion.' 149  This fraud-bribery exception clearly demonstrates the
court's consideration of the larger public policy implications of its
choice of granting or withholding relief. The plaintiff contractor
may perhaps have no more right to be free of fraud favoring a com-
petitor than to be free of mistake, or even accidental irregularity in
procurement procedure favoring his competitor. But the public pol-
icy advantages of withholding ill-gotten gains from the culpable and
possibly preventing excessive profits from being extracted from the
government in the first of these situations weigh in favor of making
this exception. Because the GAO also had the plaintiff's protest
143. 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
144. Judge Tamm, who had written the opinions in Scanwell, Blackhawk, and
Ballerina, dissented in Steinthal but did not sit in Wheelabrator.
145. 455 F.2d at 1294-95.
146. 455 F.2d at 1301.
147. Id. at 1302.
148. 455 F.2d at 1310-11. See Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. §
2301 et seq. (1970); Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 2.501
et seq. (1970).
149. 455 F.2d at 1312.
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under consideration,'50 the Wheelabrator court went on to discuss
the role of the GAO in reviewing agency decisions on letting gov-
ernment contracts. 15' The court indicated, as it did in Steinthal, 52
that the proper judicial attitude was that of keeping under consider-
ation the wide public interest-at least when the statutes whose vio-
lations were alleged were primarily designed to protect the public,
rather than the particular class to which the plaintiff belongs. 5 3
Both of these cases show the court's increasing interest in con-
sidering public policy on a broad scale. Here, because neither plain-
tiff could have shown "legal right" standing, this balanced approach
operates as a restriction on the effectiveness, for the plaintiff, of the
generous grant of standing to assert public interest issues. Had the
plaintiff been required to show "legal right" standing, this same
wide-scale interest in public policy would have been grounds for
allowing him to advance arguments outside the narrow sphere of his
own interests. The court's attitude has the effect not only of di-
vorcing technical standing questions from public policy matters, but
of reducing the importance of the choice of a particular rule on
standing. Nevertheless, it is highly questionable whether Data Proc-
essing and Barlow should have been read to allow any of these plain-
tiffs, without legal rights of their own, to succeed on the merits; 5 4
and it is at least arguable that Sierra does not do so either.'55
The Court of Claims Follows Scanwell-Keco Industries v. United
States
The Court of Claims' approach to these disappointed-bidder
cases was demonstrated in Keco Industries v. United States.'56 The
plaintiff alleged that the contracting agency had breached an implied
contract to consider plaintiff's bid fairly and honestly, and asked for
recovery of bid preparation costs and lost profits. The Court of
150. Id. at 1313.
151. Id. at 1313-17. See generally Comment, The Role of GAO and Courts in
Government Contract "Bid Protests": An Analysis of Post-Scanwell Remedies, 1972
DuKE L. 745.
152. 455 F.2d at 1302, 1306.
153. 455 F.2d at 1317.
154. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 67-80 supra and accompanying text.
156. 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. C1. 1970).
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Claims cited Scanwell with approval, 57 and deemed it controlling
in requiring a grant of standing to sue and to assert the public inter-
est.158 The court thus extended Scanwell to cases seeking damages
for the improper awarding of contracts. "Regardless of the fact that
plaintiff in the instant case is seeking money damages, it is still re-
quiring the Government to enforce its regulations fairly and hon-
estly, and treat all bidders without discrimination."'15 9 Recoveries
on implied-in-law contracts are not ordinarily available in the Court
of Claims. 160 Keco required, however, that at trial there be shown
an arbitrary and capricious action in granting the contract.'' This
requirement might have put the situation within the exception al-
lowed for recovery on an implied contract arising from fraud by a
government agent.6 2  Keco's claim for lost profits was denied,"0 8
but recovery was granted for bid preparation costs. The denial of
lost profits suggests that the basis for recovery is not really contrac-
tual, and that broad public-interest considerations limit the uses to
which contractors can put statutes aimed solely at protecting the pub-
lic. As in Steinthal and Wheelabrator, a liberal reading of the stand-
ing rules by the Keco court was effectively tempered by a concern
for the whole of the public interest. Furthermore, though the Court
of Claims approach is very much like that of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, 64 the policy considerations which arise are quite
different. This difference is a result of the difference between in-
junctive relief and damages; it demonstrates the remedy-oriented
rather than injury oriented nature of the public-policy-as-a-whole
basis for approaching standing problems.
157. Id. at 1237.
158. Id. at 1238.
159. Id.
160. E.g., United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217-18
(1926); Algonac Mfg. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241, 1256 (Ct. CL 1970);
J.C. Pitman & Sons v. United States, 317 F.2d 366, 368 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
161. 428 F.2d at 1237. If the government failed to consider the bids fairly, its
impliedly holding itself out as intending to do so might be considered fraudulent.
See 428 F.2d at 1236; Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 414
(CL Cl. 1956).
162. JC. Pitman & Sons v. United States, 317 F.2d 366, 369 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
See 428 F.2d at 1238. The implied contract might also be considered to be implied
in fact, provided a court was willing to regard a letting of bids as being an express
manifestation of an offer to consider them fairly.
163. The court said that it was not provable that the plaintiff would have been
awarded the contract if its bid had been fairly considered-because, for example,
the government was empowered to reject all bids. 428 F.2d at 1240 & n.ll.
164. Id. at 1237-38.
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Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States
Two 1972 cases in district courts, Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United
States6 5 and Merriam v. Kunzig, 66 have expressly repudiated the
Scanwell holding that a disappointed bidder has standing to chal-
lenge the government's award of a contract to its competitor. In
Gary the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Air Force
from ordering a reconsideration of an unfavorable pre-award survey
of a competitor. 167  The competitor, the apparent low bidder on
the contract, had been found not sufficiently responsible in the ini-
tial survey.16 8 The District Court for the Western District of Texas
specifically rejected the Scanwell line of cases,1 69 and dismissed the
suit. The Gary court found Lukens Steel' 70 to be controlling, and
felt that the Scanwell line of cases was inconsistent with Lukens
Steel.'7'
The Gary court's action is subject to two interpretations. Since
the court explicitly recognized the Data Processing test,172 it could
have felt that the ruling in Lukens Steel so clearly established that
losing bidders did not have the "requisite legal interest in the procure-
ment process"'173 that the procurement statutes did not even arguably
protect plaintiff's interest. Thus, the plaintiff would fail to pass the
Data Processing test and would lack standing. However, if footnote
15 of Sierra is read as now removing the legal interest test from the
165. 342 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
166. 347 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
167. The pre-award surveys are designed to separate out contractors unlikely to
be able adequately to perform the contracts. Financial situation, equipment, exper-
tise, and past performance are considered. 32 C.F.R. § 1.900 et seq. (1972). See
342 F. Supp. at 475.
168. 342 F. Supp. at 475.
169. Id. at 476. The court mentioned Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), as well as Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Keco Indus., Inc. v.
Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970); and Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317
F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
170. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
171. The decision in Data Processing, the court said, indicated that Scanwell's
holding that the APA made contractors private attorneys general was incorrect; there-
fore, the question of standing was referred to case law on statutes regulating pro-
curement-and Lukens Steel was the leading case. 342 F. Supp. at 477. See notes
129-32 supra and accompanying text.
172. 342 F. Supp. at 477.
173. Id., quoting 397 U.S. at 153.
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merits, 174 this interpretation of Gary points to a major difficulty.
If there are no cases determining on the merits whether a statute con-
fers a legal right on a person, that is, determining what zone of in-
terest is actually protected, then what is the basis for ascertaining
what "arguably" falls within this "zone of interests"? If there are no
longer to be any adjudications of when an interest is sufficiently
legally protected to grant standing in the old sense, then it is more
difficult to determine what is a sufficient argument to satisfy the
Data Processing standard. Thus, if Sierra means that Lukens Steel
is not to be applied on the merits, then is that case still usable to set
a forbidden area which "threshold argument" in the Data Processing
test sense may never reach?
The second interpretation of Gary arises principally because of
language from Data Processing quoted by the Gary court. That
language points out that the legal interest test belongs in a decision
on the merits. 17 5  Gary could thus have applied the legal interest
test to the merits as presented in the pleadings, and dismissed for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted rather than for
lack of standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit de-
cision on points of law on the pleadings; 176 presumably if a legal in-
terest test were required on the merits, it could be used in full pano-
ply at this stage of the litigation, if no material questions of fact had
arisen. The Gary court itself allowed this ambiguity to persist, say-
ing of the Lukens Steel rule: "[w]hether or not these considerations
are still subsumed under the traditional standing doctrine, they
should, and unless the Supreme Court overrules [Lukens Steel],
must be respected.'1 77  At the time the Gary decision came down,
this distinction was admittedly technical, and made no difference
in the result. But since the decision in Gary was handed down,
footnote 15 of Sierra has, perhaps, undercut Data Processing's indi-
cation that the legal interest test, though not appropriate for ques-
tions of standing, still remains a valid inquiry on the merits. Un-
der the liberal interpretation of footnote 15, Sierra has made the
Data Processing test a threshold whose crossing allows the assertion
of the public interest without any question, other than the prelim-
174. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
175. 342 F. Supp. at 477.
176. FFD. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally C. WiGirr, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 99 (1970).
177. 342 F. Supp. at 477-78.
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inary "arguably" standard, of whether the plaintiff's interests were
legally protected.178 Thus, a decision in Gary that plaintiff had failed
to pass the Data Processing test because of Lukens Steel would now
be open to less question than a Rule 56 dismissal on the grounds that
the plaintiff had alleged no legal interest, and hence would certainly
fail on the merits where he would be required to show one. The
Gary court also quoted from Wheelabrator, regarding it as limiting
Scanwell's apparent readiness to meddle in procurement decisions,
and as restating the principle that matters left to agency discretion
ought to be immune from review in most circumstances.YM The
court pointed out that in this case the action complained of had, as
in Wheelabrator, been committed to agency discretion by law.180 The
court further indicated that the plaintiff had no grounds on which to
ask the relief of equity. The plaintiff was seeking to prevent the
government fron resurveying his competitor.18' The court noted
that a new survey might show the competitor still unqualified, in
which case the relief would have been unnecessary; on the other
hand, a new survey might show the competitor qualified, in which
case the court's preventing the survey would result in the govern-
ment's having to pay more than necessary to get the required serv-
ices.'8 2 Thus the Gary court seemed quite impressed with the neces-
sity of maintaining a broad regard for the public interest while ad-
judicating contractors' claims.
Merriam v. Kunzig
In the second of these district court cases, Merriam v. Kun-
zig, 8 3 the plaintiff, a prospective lessor to the government, sought to
enjoin the General Services Administration from awarding a lease to
another bidder. The plaintiff contended that statutes forbade the
awarding of a contract for the lease of a building yet to be con-
structed, and that agency interpretations of these statutes which took
the competitors' admittedly still non-existent building out of this to-
be-built category were arbitrary and beyond the defendant's author-
178. Id. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
179. 342 F. Supp. at 478. Because of the public interest which often exists in
expeditious procurement, the refusal by the courts to hinder agency discretion may
be particularly important in government contract cases. See 455 F.2d at 1302.
180. 342 F. Supp. at 478.
181- Id. at 479.
182. Id. at 478-79.
183. 347 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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ity. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that the standards for standing set forth in Data Processing and Bar-
low had not been met. 84
Like the court in Gary, Merriam rejected Scanwell as having
gone beyond the limits the Supreme Court set shortly thereafter in
Data Processing.8 5 The addition, the court said, of the non-constitu-
tional requirement that the plaintiff's interest be within the zone in-
tended to be protected by the relevant statute was an implicit rejec-
tion of the private attorney general concept-at least without an ex-
press statutory base on which to found such a grant. The extra
restriction, it said, would be meaningless if the APA itself was held,
as Blackhawk suggests, 8 6 to arguably create such a protected
zone. 87 The Merriam court found that Congress' intent in passing
the leasing statute was solely to limit federal spending, not to protect
prospective lessors;' ss therefore, the court held that the plaintiff
lacked standing.1s9
The district court went on to point out that the dismissal for
lack of standing was also probably an anticipation of plaintiff's
failure on the merits.' 90 Since the court could not order the execu-
tion of a contract with the plaintiff, the only remedy would be to
set aside the present award. This action would not necessarily re-
sult in full relief for the plaintiff.' 91 Furthermore, the court sug-
gested that any attempt to give the plaintiff additional relief would
work against a particularly relevant factor of the public interest-
184. After this Note was set in type, Merriam v. Kunzig was reversed in an opin-
ion which attempted to adopt Scanwell. 32 Ai. L.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1973). In reply
to the contention that Scanwell was inconsistent with Data Processing, the court
found that a true legal interest was present. The court's argument-that the re-
quired rejection of nonconforming bids, for example, showed an intent to protect
contractors and could not protect the government-is persuasive but not logically
necessary; for the government itself certainly does have an interest in buying only
conforming merchandise and in keeping bids comparable by requiring all bids to be
for the same goods or services.
185. 347 F. Supp. at 723.
186. 433 F.2d at 1140. See notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text.
187. 347 F. Supp. at 723.
188. Id. at 721. The plaintiff had conceded this point as well. Id.
189. Id. at 724.
190. Id.
191. Because procurement statutes are often designed to insure the proper opera-
tion of the government and protect the public, rather than the rights of government
contractors, the remedies, both express and implicit, connected with these statutes
are not necessarily appropriate for the full satisfaction of the contractors' claims.
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allowing the government to contract for the most appropriate satis-
faction of its needs.192
Conclusion
The limitation put on government contractors' rights to chal-
lenge procurement decisions which is created by the Supreme Court
cases establishing the present doctrine of standing is thus not clear.
Although competitors of successful bidders do seem to suffer injury
in fact,'9 3 something more than injury in fact will be required. 9
The "arguably within the zone of interest" test can be applied as
strictly as the Gary court does when it uses Lukens Steel as a basis,' 95
or as loosely as the District of Columbia Circuit has when using
Scanwell.'9 6 Within even the strict legal right framework, the Scan-
well result could be obtained either by a holding that Congress in-
tended to protect such competitors when it legislated on procurement
matters,197 or that its intention to protect the public naturally in-
cluded an intention to regularize the procurement process by giving
aggrieved contractors some kind of remedy.' 98  A holding that this
192. Id. For example, forbidding the competitor to bid on a new advertisement
would have this effect.
193. Economic injury from competition is recognized. Investment Co. Institute
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
194. But see note 50 supra.
195. See notes 170-73 supra and accompanying text.
196. See notes 133-41 supra and accompanying text.
197. This would require that Lukens Steel, though not the legal right standing
concept, be overruled. See notes 106-08 supra and accompanying text.
198. The use of either of these theories would require a determination of the
place at which the balance must be struck between the short-term and the long-
term public interest. That is, the efficacy of the argument such as "despite the
fact that an award to me will cause delay or extra expense to the government, the
encouragement of contractors' faith in the fairness of the procurement process will
be a benefit in the long run" must be determined. While striking a balance of this
sort has traditionally been done by equity courts on a case by case basis, it seems
also a subject easily susceptible of legislative determination. A judicial interpre-
tation of legislative intent in this area would begin to create signs of the legal in-
terest test-that test may have resulted from a feeling that the legislature would
provide explicit remedies when the public good required, and the lack of an ex-
plicit remedy must indicate a predetermination that little public good would flow
from granting one. Used less rigorously, such an argument might, instead of pre-
cluding the raising of all public interest issues, require only that the public good as-
serted be expected to flow directly from the remedy sought. Instead of the stat-
ute being read as protecting only the public, it could be read as principally protect-
ing the public from a particular injury, and arguments be restricted to those based
on alleviating that injury.
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was always arguably the case, together with a broad reading of foot-
note 15 in Sierra would have the same result.
A narrower reading of Sierra would leave the legal interest test
more or less intact for application on the merits, but a plaintiff might
be allowed to make public interest arguments when they were suffi-
ciently related to his own particular interest. A contractor could
make the argument in his own right that an award to him would in-
crease contractors' confidence generally. While the good to the public
which would result from this confidence would likely be considered
also, he could not assert that an award to him would save the pub-
lic's money for this is not sufficiently related to the issue of contrac-
tors' confidence. This latter result seems anomalous, and could per-
haps be kept from being so only by a very narrow restriction to situ-
ations like that in the hypothetical example in Sierra,19 where the
harm done to the plaintiff was a species of the harm done to the
public.20 0  Otherwise, a concentration on granting standing to plain-
tiffs only to assert public benefits which are intended to operate
through them accomplishes little. If a statute is intended to affect
the plaintiff, without necessarily being intended to benefit him, it
will find in him no better a defender of the public good than
would be found in a plaintiff affected by but not within the intent of
the act.201  On the other hand, restriction of complainants to those
benefited in the same manner as the public does provide the public
with an advocate whose interests are more in concert with its own.202
If the broader view of Sierra is taken, any contractor passing
the Data Processing threshold test can assert any arguments he wishes
to use on the merits, without regard to their lack of relationship to him.
This approach avoids some of the technical problems of the nar-
rower reading, but it has two less beneficial effects. The rather
ephemeral issue of what Congress arguably intended becomes more
199. See text preceding note 67 supra.
200. See text following note 76 supra.
201. In Lukens Steel the wage minima were supposed to operate through gov-
ernment contractors and hence were intended to affect them. But the interests of
the contractors and those of the beneficiaries of the Act were opposed. See
notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
202. The intent of Congress to affect a plaintiff is not the same as an intent to
grant him standing. Perhaps the suggestion here can be justified by reasoning that
Congress intended to benefit the public, and that this intent on the issue of standing




critical, °0 and the possibility exists that neither litigant will be a
good representative of the public interest Congress wanted to pro-
tect.
The complicated difficulties which arise with technical distinc-
tions of this nature are considerably ameliorated by all these courts'
-Wheelabrator's, Merriam's and Gary's-interest in considering the
public interest on a broad scale.2"' This wide-ranged basis tends
to control and regularize the arguments made by a plaintiff who is
given a broad grant of standing, and on the other hand to broaden
the arguing base of a plaintiff whose grant of standing is restricted.
The remedy-based rather than injury-based approach to these pub-
lic policy questions'0 5 allows these cases to produce the best results
for the public without the necessity of relying, probably unsatisfac-
torily, on one of the technical intermediate positions on injury-based
standing. 06 Of course, the choice of a particular standing rule
makes a difference to the plaintiffs, since it determines whether or
not they will be in court at all. Given that a plaintiff has standing,
however, the course of the litigation does not depend so much on
the choice of the standing rule which is made.
Nevertheless it appears that an establishment of guidelines by
the Supreme Court in the area of standing for disappointed contrac-
tors would be desirable. All the courts whose cases are here dis-
cussed agree that the Data Processing standard ought to be ap-
plied, 0 7 but they differ in the way in which they apply that standard.
Gary's apparent view that Lukens Steel 08 makes none of these con-
tractors' interests even arguably protected except in the case of an
unusual statute like the one in Kentucky Utilities is one extreme; the
lax application of the Data Processing standard in Blackhawk is the
other.2 0 9 Because of the pervasive operation of the APA, °10 it seems
unlikely that the District of Columbia Circuit's original idea in Scan-
well that the APA itself arguably creates a zone of protected interests
will be accepted. This result would not be sufficiently different from
203. See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
204. 455 F.2d at 1317; 347 F. Supp. at 724; 342 F. Supp. at 479.
205. See 455 F.2d at 1302.
206. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., 433 F.2d at 1204; 433 F.2d at 1140; 347 F. Supp. at 720; 342 F.
Supp. at 477. A notable eyception is the Court of Claims, which has apparently
never cited Data Processing.
208. See notes 170-73 supra and accompanying text.
209. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
210. See note 120 supra.
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that of the rejected Brennan-White standing theory211-standing
ought to be accorded to anyone who can show injury in fact. How-
ever, this latter position has strong support among the commentators
as well as in the Court,212 and might eventually be adopted.
The divorce of the standing issue from the merits of a case in
Data Processing and subsequent cases left a question of whether the
legal interest test was still to be applied to arguments on the merits.
The Gary court seemed to think it ought to be so applied; other
courts are less certain. Sierra2 13 has weakened arguments that
could be made for its retention; however, the Supreme Court could
still create separate rules for different types of cases and allow the
assertion of public interests more often in environmental cases, for in-
stance, than in procurement cases. The removal of the legal interest
requirement seems to leave all these courts vaguely uncomfortable
with contractors' insistence on hard adherence to procurement regu-
lations. All of the courts agree that some matters are and ought
to be left to the procuring agencies' discretion, and agree that inter-
vention ought to be allowed only to correct abuses of this discre-
tion.214 The Merriam court's feeling that remedies available to the
disgruntled contractor were not likely to be satisfactory is yet an-
other aspect of the contractor's lack of a legal interest.21 All
these courts are willing to keep under consideration the broad public
interest in the government's contracting for the most appropriate
goods and services at the best price.216 It is thus likely that inter-
pretations of procurement statutes will be made with the public in-
terest, rather than contractors' rights, in mind. With this limitation,
the concession of standing to losing bidders may allow the correction
of procurement abuses without excessive interference by the con-
tractors in the procurement process.
211. This theory is expressed in a concurring opinion in Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159, 167 (1970) (Brennan, J.). See note 50 supra.
212. See 3 DAvIs § 22.18, at 291.
213. See text following note 177 supra.
214. See notes 149, 179 supra and accompanying text; cf. 347 F. Supp. at 724.
215. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 149-53 supra and accompanying text and note 191 supra.
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